Ethics and evidence-based practice by Allmark, Peter
PRE-PUBLICATION DRAFT COPY 
 
1 
This is a draft of a chapter that will be appearing in the forthcoming Routledge book Exploring 
Evidence-based Practice: Debates and Challenges in Nursing (2015), available for pre-purchase here: 
http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9781138789906/ 
 
Ethics and Evidence-Based Practice 
 
1. Introduction 
Evidence-based practice is roughly the use of current best evidence in making 
decisions about the care of patients (Sackett et al. 1996).  At first it seems hard to 
imagine how such practice could raise ethical concerns; and yet it has.  These 
concerns are set out in the first section of this chapter.  Much of the past 
discussion of these problems has focused on the epistemology of evidence, with 
critics suggesting that EBP is based on an overly narrow definition of evidence and 
knowledge.  This chapter tacks differently, focusing instead on the epistemology of 
practice; in other words, what type of evidence or knowledge is needed in deciding 
how to act?  Using the distinction drawn by Aristotle between practical and 
scientific knowledge it is suggested that evidence in the form of scientific knowledge, 
no matter how widely defined, cannot form the basis for practice because it cannot 
provide the goals that action requires; for EBP these must be provided from within 
practice itself, for example, nursing or surgery.  However, ultimately the goals are 
provided by wider personal and social goals, in particular, human flourishing.  
Once this is accepted, it is possible to resolve the ethical concerns that have been 
raised about EBP, drawing on Aristotle's account of reasoning in the practice areas 
of craft knowledge and of practical wisdom.   
 
2. Ethical concerns 
At least four ethical concerns are found in the literature on EBP. 
 
1) Some types of knowledge are not included in EBP 
EBP downgrades or discounts types of knowledge that are used by practitioners 
and which are important for good practice; these include experience, intuition and 
anecdote (Barker 2000; Bax 2008; Milton 2007; Tonelli 1998).  In health care, EBP 
fits best with tightly defined areas of practice, particularly pharmacology, but is ill 
suited for the more craft-like areas, such as surgery and nursing.  In these areas, 
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experience counts for a great deal, and a patient would be better served by an 
experienced practitioner rather than one well-versed in recent research evidence.  
The obvious riposte here is that the patient is best served by one well-versed in 
both.  However, the point is rather that experience and intuition can point in 
directions counter to those suggested by EBP.  For example, whilst guidelines 
based on EBP might suggest a new treatment for all patients, a practitioner might 
believe that overall, some patients who are well established on the old treatment 
would be best left on it (for example, those who would find it difficult to establish 
new routines).  A surgeon during a procedure might decide to try something new on 
the basis of a hunch, even though little or no EBP-evidence exists to support it 
(Stirrat 2004).  Another type of example in the literature is described as a Lazarus 
case, in which the practitioners, despite EBP-based guidelines, decided to carry on 
treating a patient who unexpectedly revived and left hospital relatively well (Brant-
Zawadzki 2012).   
 
2) EBP runs counter to patient-centred care 
This concern is a continuation: the type of knowledge that is discounted by EBP is 
often specific to case or circumstance.  By insisting that all practice is based on up-
to-date research evidence where it is available, patient-centred care, which requires 
case-specific knowledge and intuition, is undermined.  The issue arises particularly 
where EBP enters protocols and guidelines which are supposed to be used as the 
primary decision-making aid for practitioner.  There are two types of problem:  
 Patients lose choice; they are constrained to have what the evidence tells 
them to, a phenomenon that has been described as evidence-based 
paternalism (Rysavy 2013; Slowther et al. 2004; Liberati 2004).  Of course, it 
might be asked why patients would want a less effective treatment anyway.  
However, patients might have different notions of effectiveness to those 
measured in the research evidence.  An obvious example is where the EB 
judgement includes cost effectiveness; for example, an individual patient 
might prefer a treatment of only marginally superior efficacy but much 
greater cost.  But even where cost is not an issue patients might have factors 
that matter to them but which are not judged overly important in the 
outcome measures of EBP; for example, American guidance recommending 
statins for all patients with diabetes was rejected by many patients (Montori 
et al. 2013).   
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 Practitioners lose choice; they can no longer make choices that fit individual 
patients but which run counter to the guidelines of EBP (Loewy 2007; 
Kerridge et al. 1998; Gupta 2004b; Gupta 2003; Gupta 2014; Gupta 2004a).  
Again it might be asked why practitioners would want less effective or 
unproven treatments.  However, we have already seen one case, that of 
allowing some patients to remain on the apparently inferior old treatment.  
Another might be a Health Visitor who senses that a new mother is under 
stress, struggling with breast feeding and in need of a kind of permission to 
give up and switch to bottle feeding.  To encourage such a switch runs 
counter to evidence-based guidelines and yet in certain situations Health 
Visitors might do so.  A cancer nurse might meld conventional EB treatment 
with a patient's own unproven (or even proven not to work) treatments.  A 
mother using ineffective colic drops for their baby might be encouraged to 
wean the child off them rather than stop straight away, as EBP would 
suggest.  It is almost certain that many, perhaps most, practitioners could 
give further examples.  It is not simply that some practice has to be 
undertaken in the absence of good evidence, it is that practitioners' practical 
knowledge, based on anecdote, intuition or similar, can suggest practice that 
runs counter to that which is suggested by EBP. 
 
3) "Testable by RCT" is not the same as "most effective" 
EBP puts highest value on evidence from randomised controlled trials (RCTs).  
However, this can produce unethical results (Zwitter 2001; Vos et al. 2004; Vineis 
2004; Rysavy 2013).  Consider two treatments that are proposed to reduce rates of 
heart disease in an area.  The first is a publicity campaign to reduce smoking; the 
second, a campaign focused on social determinants of heart disease which aims to 
reduce poverty through welfare advice and work on financial capability.  It is 
relatively straightforward to test the first by RCT; researchers could, for example, 
use a cluster randomised trial in matched areas of the country.  The outcomes 
could be easily measured by, say, six-week quit rates.  And there would be no 
ethical concerns - the researchers would be in equipoise as to whether or not the 
campaign works.  Equipoise is the state in which the practice community is 
genuinely unsure as to whether one treatment is superior to another; it is 
considered to be an ethically necessary condition prior to any randomisation; if it 
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does not exist then clinicians would be randomly and unethically allocating 
patients to a treatment they believed inferior (Ashcroft & ter Meulen 2004).  By 
contrast, the social-determinant orientated intervention is harder to evaluate.  
There would be no immediate health-related scores, such as quit rates, that could 
be used.  It would be possible to measure other scores, such as anxiety, but the 
link to health improvement would be slower and less obvious.  There would also be 
an ethical concern concerning equipoise.  The researchers do not know whether or 
not the intervention is useful in terms of health and as such equipoise exists and a 
cluster randomised design could be used.  However, it is already known that 
interventions like this are effective in terms of reducing debt problems (Allmark et 
al. 2013).  In such cases, it seems unethical to randomise people into a trial 
knowing that one group will get a less effective treatment than another.  There are 
two key points from the example.  The first is that the EBP pyramid can lead 
practitioners to prefer treatments that are testable by RCT but which may in fact be 
less effective than others which are not.  The second is that practitioners might be 
pushed towards undertaking trials that are ethically dubious in order to meet the 
randomisation requirement.   
 
4) Decisions based on EBP can be unjust 
Those funding a health system would seem well advised only to fund interventions 
for which there is evidence.  The preference for RCT-testable interventions 
described in the previous paragraph easily mutates into a preference for funding 
such interventions (Ashcroft & ter Meulen 2004; Vos et al. 2004; Kerridge et al. 
1998; Jansen 1997; Hughes 1996; Hope 1995).  This can result in what seem to be 
unjust decisions of various types.  In the first place, rare conditions are difficult to 
test via RCTs as there are insufficient cases to run a trial likely to reach statistical 
significance.  Patients with these conditions might find that promising but 
insufficiently tested treatments are unfunded.  Other conditions are common but 
are such that it is difficult to find funding to run expensive RCTs of their treatment.  
This might be because the conditions are suffered by those with low economic 
power; an example might be diarrhoea in developing countries.  Or it might be 
because the condition is such that successful treatment of it is low-profit.  This has 
been the case with the development of antibiotics for multi-resistant bacteria; the 
problem here is that the drugs are used on too short-term a basis for companies 
funding research to recoup their research costs.  By contrast, conditions that are 
widespread in affluent populations and which require long-term treatment are 
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likely to be supported by many treatments that are well supported by RCT evidence, 
depression for example.  For similar reasons, certain types of patients may be 
poorly supported by RCT evidence, as is the case for those with multiple 
pathologies, the elderly and children.  Finally, certain features of patients might be 
ignored or insufficiently accounted in RCTs meaning that it can be unclear whether 
a treatment is effective for patients on the basis of, for example, ethnicity or class.  
In summary, rationing based on EBP is likely to be unfair across a number of axes 
of inequality. 
 
Summary 
EBP has the foundational belief that practice should be based on the best evidence 
available.  This implies that some evidence is better than others; the meta-analysis 
of multiple well-conducted RCTs is better than the intuition of a practitioner in 
deciding whether, for example, one treatment is better than another.  However, 
implementation of EBP based on a hierarchy of evidence which puts RCTs at the 
top has resulted in a number of ethical concerns.  EBP, it is said, can result in 
unethical practice where: i) it overrides the decisions of practitioners borne of their 
knowledge gained through experience; ii) it disempowers the ability of patients to 
choose on the basis of their own ideas and values; iii) it results in preference given 
for treatments that are most easily tested by RCTs; and iv) it is used in rationing 
and allocation decisions which tend to favour the existence of evidence over the 
presence of need.   
 
3. Initial responses 
The critical response to these concerns has focused on epistemology as the source 
of problems.  Some critics reject outright epistemology that prioritises RCT-style 
knowledge, suggesting it is unsuitable for, say, nursing, which, it is claimed, is 
largely based on an entirely different type of practice knowledge (Barker 2000; Bax 
2008).  On first examination, however, this looks implausible.  The EBP pyramid is 
not a production of fiat on the part of, say, doctors over nurses or quantitative 
researchers over qualitative ones.  It is based on recognition of the nature of 
scientific method as being in large part concerned with the elimination of error.  
The literature on sources of error in reasoning is immense and overwhelming; if a 
nurse is to claim that she prefers by intuition to give treatment X to this particular 
patient in the face of strong RCT evidence preferring the contrary she will fall foul 
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of this evidence (Thaler & Sunstein 2009; Glass & McAtee 2006; Sutherland 1994).  
Her decision will be evidently wrong because it is less likely to achieve the desired 
goal than a decision based on the RCT evidence.   
 
Others have emphasised the importance of the use of other types of evidence in 
practice.  Some of these accept the EBP pyramid, which puts RCT and meta-
analyses as the best basis for practice, but allow other evidence when the former is 
unavailable or unobtainable.  An example is the Medical Research Council 
Guidance on so-called natural experiments (Craig et al. 2012).  Such experiments 
are the use of environmental differences that are not in the researchers' control to 
assess an effect, for example, the introduction of legislation, or changes in taxation, 
on health behaviour.  The MRC guidance leaves the pyramid unaltered, merely 
acknowledging that randomisation is either practically or politically impossible in 
some cases.    
 
Other critics suggest that the pyramid itself is unsuitable for certain areas of 
practice.  For example, Pawson and others suggest that RCTs are suitable only for 
research in relatively closed systems, such as drugs acting on bodies.  In these 
closed systems it is relatively easy to remove or reduce the effect of confounding 
factors.  However, RCTs are not suitable for open systems, such as social 
interventions to change behaviour of people in society (Pawson 2013).  Here there 
are so many confounding factors that the attempt to impose control of them 
reduces the intervention to something that is nothing like what will appertain in 
practice.  Thus, for example, you might show that an educational intervention to 
increase exercise works at 6 weeks after a stroke for under-65-year-old English 
speaking men attending a programme run by well-motivated researchers in 
Yorkshire in August 2010 but it is unlikely that the programme will be as effective 
(or effective at all) amongst Asian women in Lancashire in December 2014 (see 
Snelling's criticism in this volume of the 'ludicrous' level of compliance required in 
a randomised study of intentional rounding).  The realist revolution in social 
research currently taking place is in part based on recognition of this.  However, 
note that this does not get the critics of EBP very far.  On the realist account, there 
is still a hierarchy of evidence; it is just that RCTs are not always at the top; they 
are replaced by something like realist synthesis (Pawson 2002); but even if this 
were done, the four areas of ethical concern set out above would remain in some 
form.     
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These initial responses to the ethical concerns have focused on the epistemology of 
‘evidence’.  It will be argued now that as well as considering the ‘evidence’ in EBP it 
is also necessary to consider the idea of practice being ‘based’ in evidence.  The 
argument draws upon Aristotle's account of practical reasoning and the various 
distinctions he makes.  One such distinction is that between scientific and 
practical knowledge.  It will be argued that EBP errs where it is uses scientific 
knowledge as the sole or primary basis for practical decisions.  For practice, 
scientific knowledge is only one element (or base) of what is required.  This 
Aristotelian approach is then brought to bear on the ethical concerns that have 
been set out concerning EBP.  The starting point is a brief account of Aristotle's 
theory of action, as set out in various places, including briefly in Nicomachean 
Ethics and in more depth in De Motu Animalum (Aristotle 2000; Aristotle & 
Nussbaum 1985).1  
 
4. Knowledge-based practice 
Practice of the type identified in EBP is a type of action; it is purposeful or 
intentional action by practitioners with goals that are generally focused on the 
health or wellbeing of others.  Action is, for Aristotle, a movement of some kind the 
origin of which lies within the thing that moves.  Generally, these are living things; 
as such, they are able to act without being acted upon.  When a tree blows in the 
wind it is acted upon; but when it grows or sucks up nutrition from the ground, it 
acts.  However, it does so without intention, its action is autonomic.  Animals too 
can be acted upon, like trees, and they can act autonomically, as when they digest 
food.  However, they are also able to act on the basis of their internal states of 
desire in combination with their perception of external stimuli; a hungry animal 
that perceives food will, other things being equal, move to obtain and eat the food.  
Humans, as a type of animal, are capable of all such motion: involuntary, as when 
being acted upon, autonomic, as with digestion, and voluntary, as with acting in 
accordance with a desire in the manner of all animals.  However, humans are 
capable of another layer of desire, rational or reasoned desire, which gives rise to 
another type of action, intentional action.  This is a desire that does not just arise 
from their animal nature, like appetite for food or sex, but which is endorsed as 
                                            
1 Appendix 3 sets out some of the Aristotelian terms used in this chapter and compares them with alternatives 
found in translation as well as with the original Greek. 
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good or not by some process of reasoning.  Thus a person who is hungry and 
perceives food that is easily obtainable might nonetheless avoid it because he has a 
reasoned desire to lose weight.  To summarise in table form: 
 
 
 
                           Object 
Type of action 
Inanimate Animate 
Plant Animal Human/Rational 
animal 
Involuntary: Moved with 
origin of movement outside 
self 
    
Non-voluntary: Origin in self 
(no desire) 
    
Voluntary: i) Origin in self 
(with appetite-type desire) 
    
Voluntary: ii) Origin in self 
(with rational desire) – 
intentional/purposive action 
    
 
Table 1: Types of action in inanimate and animate objects 
 
 
Purposeful or intentional action is, then, action which is undertaken in the light of 
the agent's belief that some good is to be obtained through it.  This good might be 
instrumental, constitutive or both.  For example, the activity of working as a nurse 
might be instrumental, say, to obtaining money to do the things the agent wants.  
By contrast, building model boats might be constitutive, something the agent does 
that he views as good in itself.  And working as a nurse could be both instrumental, 
to get money, and constitutive, because the agent views it as worthwhile or good in 
itself.  The simple model of reasoned action is thus,  
 
i. Agent has a reasoned desire for x (where x is an instrumental or constitutive 
good) 
ii. Agent recognises the situation as one in which action  (pronounced 'phi') is 
one that will achieve x without any negative effects that outweigh it 
iii. Agent decides to  
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iv. In the absence of countervailing forces, agent s 
 
Evidence in this model comes into play in the second premise (ii); for example, the 
agent desires to treat an infection and knows that RCTs have shown treatment A to 
be most effective.  However, note that no decision will form and no action take 
place without the first premise (i), the goal and desire.  This point is important: 
evidence of itself does not have and cannot provide a goal.  No action, be it practice 
or other, can be based on evidence alone.   
 
"Mere thought, however, moves nothing; it must be goal-directed 
and practical" [Aristotle trans. Crisp 1139a]. 
 
Action requires, first, some kind of evidence such that the agent recognises the 
situation as one where a desire can be fulfilled plus, second, the desire.  Thus in 
judging the reasonableness or otherwise of an action we need to consider at least 
two sets of evidence: first, the evidence by which the agent recognises the situation 
that requires  in order to achieve x and, second, the evidence (or other 
considerations) by which the agent forms the reasoned desire for x at the outset.   
 
The evidence referred to and discussed in relation to EBP belongs primarily in the 
first category, that is, it is evidence for  as the most likely means to achieve x.  
Where does the evidence of the second type originate, that is, the evidence for the 
goal itself?  Here it is useful to draw upon a distinction Aristotle makes between 
two categories of practical activity, production or craft (techne) and praxis.  (The 
latter term is transliterated as it is awkward to translate; it will, however, be 
defined by explanation.)  2 
 
Production/craft is practical activity best shown by examples, such as playing a 
musical instrument, constructing a boat, performing surgery and nursing a patient.  
Here, the goal is provided from within the craft, to play a tune, build a boat, repair 
an aneurysm or return a patient to reasonable living.  And the goal will typically be 
broken down into stages, although this is more obvious in examples like building a 
boat than playing a tune.  To do the production/craft well, the agent will need a 
                                            
2 Lipscomb, in this book, addresses the specific issue of how much and what research 
evidence a particular practitioner needs or could be expected to have.  This is an important 
issue not specifically addressed in the current paper. 
PRE-PUBLICATION DRAFT COPY 
 
10 
variety of attributes or, broadly, what Aristotle terms (craft-specific) virtues.  For 
playing a tune, these might be specific technical abilities but also the discipline to 
practice and apply them.  For nursing, the range of virtues required will be different, 
including knowledge of up-to-date research evidence; but as well as knowing this, 
the nurse will need the ability to apply it to specific situations.  Finally note that 
the goals of production/craft do not have to be good for the agent or for the wider 
world.  Assassination could be termed a craft; a good assassin would require a 
range of skills and knowledge; but being an assassin seems unlikely to be 
something that serves the individual or the world well in general. 
 
Praxis is practical activity of which there is also a huge variety but (unlike crafts) in 
broad terms only one goal, that of living well.  It is the activity undertaken by 
people as either constitutive of or instrumental to doing or living well (eupraxia and 
eudaimonia).  As such, it might be thought that everything the agent does is praxis, 
including all her production/craft activities.  The assassin has goals and skills 
internal to her craft but also presumably undertakes it in the belief it is 
instrumental to living well overall.  However, for Aristotle, such a person may be a 
good assassin but be mistaken about living well, hence mistaken in her praxis.  It 
might be better to say that everything the person chooses to do she does in part as 
praxis but that it is not necessarily good praxis.  In order to achieve that, certain 
specific virtues and skills are required.  These can be broadly divided into ethical 
and intellectual virtues. 
 
Ethical virtues relate to desire.  In order to act a person must desire; we noted the 
example earlier of the hungry dieter who forgoes available food.  Ethical virtue is 
possessed by someone whose desires are in line with good reasoning, with the 
choices that will constitute good praxis.  But for good reasoning itself the person 
needs intellectual virtues of various types.  The overall one is practical wisdom 
(phronesis) but this has many elements key amongst which are: 
 Nous, a word that has come down directly into English (usually pronounced 
‘nowse’) to mean a kind of worldly-wise attitude, perhaps a slightly cynical 
one.  In right action it has three roles: To i) read current circumstances 
correctly as, for example, something that requires urgent action; ii) recognise 
the features of the situation that are relevant prior to deliberating; and iii) 
recognise that deliberation is complete and an action settled upon.   
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 Good-end deliberation (euboulia), that is, reasoning well about living well, 
correctly reasoning about what goes into making a happy, flourishing life.   
 
 Cleverness (deinotes) which is the ability to work out the particular means to 
particular goals.  Aristotle recognises that this third element can be 
damaging if it is possessed by someone with bad goals.   
These ideas can be summarised and developed as follows: 
 
 
 
Productive activity End Virtue Knowledge/evidence 
required 
Praxis Living or doing 
well 
Ethical virtue Knowledge of the 
good Nous 
Good-end 
deliberation 
Cleverness 
  
Production/craft Craft-specific Craft-specific  Craft-specific, 
sometimes including 
research evidence 
Quasi-nous 
Quasi-cleverness 
 
 
Table 2: Two types of productive activity and their related features 
 
 
As illustrated by the assassin, production/craft does not require ethical virtue; for 
similar reasons, neither does it require good-end deliberation.  However, the craft-
person does require types of nous and cleverness that are specific to the production.  
The nurse referred to earlier requires not just research evidence but also the nous-
like ability to know that this is a situation in which it is pertinent.  She also 
requires the ability to work out specific steps in particular situations to achieve a 
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goal, an ability termed quasi-cleverness in the table above.  With this account of 
practical knowledge in hand it is now possible to return to the puzzles with which 
this chapter began and attempt to resolve them. 
 
 
 
5. Practical knowledge and the ethics of EBP 
 
The ‘evidence’ referred to in EBP relates largely to scientific knowledge, to what is, 
or is probably on current evidence, the case.  In terms of its relation to action it is 
neutral because it is not tied to any particular ends.  To take a simple example, the 
Romans and Ancient Greeks were aware that human effluent poisoned a water 
supply.  One action that resulted from this scientific knowledge was building 
settlements such that effluent was disposed downstream.  However, another was 
the earliest known example of chemical warfare when troops would deliberately 
poison the water supplies of cities under siege (Roffey et al. 2002).  Here the same 
knowledge forms the basis for completely opposed actions.  Thus one form of 
knowledge that EBP cannot supply is that of the right ends.  Where does this 
knowledge come from and what evidence relates to it? 
 
The ends of action can be provided from within a practice, such as nursing, surgery 
and assassin-craft (for want of a better word).  The scientific knowledge of causes of 
infection will fuel different choices of action within each practice, surgeons and 
nurses avoiding it, assassins, perhaps, deliberately causing it.  In this process they 
are likely to use other types of knowledge.  The executive knowledge of cleverness 
results in their knowing how to develop a plan to achieve the end; the how-to 
knowledge of experience results in their knowing how to, for example, do things 
aseptically.  With such practical knowledge, scientific type knowledge of the RCT-
type seems tangential at best.  Aseptic technique is learnt largely by doing, not by 
learning the results of experiments.   
 
This gives purchase to some of the concerns about EBP; a nurse or surgeon making 
executive decisions of skill will use knowledge that is not of the EBP type, based as 
it is rather in the experience of the practitioner.  However, this has not yet taken us 
to the heart of the problem.  Proponents of EBP should have no difficulty 
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acknowledging that skill-type and executive-type knowledge will be required, as 
well as the scientific knowledge they champion.  What they would not acknowledge 
would be the possibility of conflict between them; roughly, if you want to achieve 
ends within a practice, they would claim, then you should use the best scientific 
knowledge available; surgery requires practical skill but the surgeon should not 
use procedures, however skilfully, that have been shown to be less then best in 
terms of health outcomes.   
 
It is then to outcomes and ends that we should look to resolve the concerns 
detailed at the beginning of the chapter.  Table 2 shows that the ends of a practice 
are set by that practice such that different practices might use the same knowledge 
for contrary ends, such as saving lives and ending them.  One way in which EBP 
might run counter to good practice would be where its proponents were advising 
the wrong ends.  A number of examples where this might be claimed were given 
earlier: the nurse who advised some of her patients to stick with their old, 
apparently inferior, medication; the Health Visitor who did not advise breast 
feeding; the nurse who combines evidence-based medication with the patient’s own 
preferred non-evidence based ones.   If the goal of practice in this case was to 
provide EB care then such practitioners would indeed be wrong.  However, it is not.   
 
To take the Health Visitor example, the actual goal is, something like, to take the 
steps most likely to lead to a happy and healthy parenting of the child.  Despite the 
Health Visitor knowing the breast-feeding is in general associated with healthier 
children, in this case she can see, on the basis of knowledge from beyond health-
research, that it might well go wrong and that not pushing breast feeding is a 
better option.  Much of this is down to nous, particularly here the ability of the 
Health Visitor to discern the relevant particulars (Sherman 1989).  EBP-style 
evidence will be of great import but is defeasible by local particular factors.  Thus 
the EBP evidence shows that babies who are breast-fed generally do better on a 
large number of indicators that are important in this specific case; as such, the 
Health Visitor will be inclined to recommend it.  However, she discerns specific 
differences here; the mother’s awkward relationship with her own body; her family’s 
lack of support; her signs of emotional distress.  And these cause the Health Visitor 
to choose a different action. 
 
PRE-PUBLICATION DRAFT COPY 
 
14 
However, that this is a tricky and hazardous argument can be illustrated in the 
Lazarus-type cases.  In these, practitioners make a decision to carry on treating 
apparently hopeless cases and then find themselves vindicated by successful 
outcomes.  Might not such practitioners also point to nous, to discerning there was 
something about this case that made them feel they should press on?  Such post 
hoc reasoning is notoriously unreliable.  How can a distinction be made between 
the implausible magical-type nous claimed in some Lazarus cases from the more 
plausible examples, such as the Health Visitor’s?  
 
Broadie’s discussion of practical wisdom and the present author’s own example 
provides a possible answer (Broadie 1991; Allmark 2005).  An old-master painting 
is for auction and an art expert is sent at short notice to bid for it on behalf of a 
client.  He arrives late and bidding is apparently near its end.  He has been told to 
bid above the present level but when he looks at the painting he instantly decides 
not to bid; he believes it a fake.  The painting is sold and subsequently a legal 
dispute arises between the successful bidder and the auction house as to the 
painting’s authenticity.  In this case, the art expert could reasonably point to nous; 
he could sense something wrong about the painting.  However, were he asked to set 
out in detail his concerns he could do so; the brush-strokes were too broad; the 
colours were of a type this painter never used; and so on.  He didn’t go through this 
step-by-step but, rather, he instantaneously used a chain of reasoning he could 
provide if called upon.  The same must apply in these cases of particular judgement.  
The Health Visitor can provide such a chain; the Lazarus practitioner cannot. This 
is an important caveat to notions such as reflection-in-action (see Rolfe's chapter in 
this book); reflexivity of itself is of little practical use unless it is in-principle visible 
and analysable.   
 
This gives sufficient detail to tackle the problems set out at the beginning of this 
chapter: 
 
1) Some types of knowledge are not included in EBP  
2) EBP runs counter to patient-centred care 
 
Some types of knowledge are indeed not included in EBP, of which skill-type 
knowledge (know-how) and nous (knowing what to do and when to act) are 
particularly relevant to practice.  However, these will only lead to apparent disputes 
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with EBP where there are specific details in the particular situation which are 
relevant and which are not accounted for in the evidence base, such as the 
mother’s awkwardness.  Practitioners calling upon such knowledge need to be 
cautious and need to provide a credible account of why such particulars are 
relevant in any particular case.   
 
3) "Testable by RCT" is not the same as "most effective" 
 
This concern was largely dealt with in section 3 above.  As it stands, this is a 
problem not of EBP but of the inappropriate placing of RCTs at the top of the 
pyramid of evidence types.  As stated earlier, recent developments in realist 
methodology have shown that alternative methods might sit atop the pyramid in 
relation to research in open systems.  It remains the case that EBP, even of this 
type, may yet be what practitioners choose not to apply in particular cases for the 
reasons just given and with the same caveats.   
 
4) Decisions based on EBP can be unjust. 
 
Consider a nurse facing a patient with a pressure sore and another having a 
cardiac arrest; she would clearly prioritise the latter even though the evidence base 
for the treatment of the former might be stronger.  Although this example is clear, 
in practice such decisions can go wrong in ways that are easily masked.  Thus 
community practitioners might decide there is insufficient evidence to attempt a 
health-screening intervention in an under-researched community, such as the 
Roma, even though it is used successfully in the majority community.  For the 
individual health care practitioner, the message is that the availability of evidence 
should not guide decisions about priorities of treatment; these priorities must be 
decided on the basis of the ends of the practice itself.   
 
On a larger scale, funding decisions might be made by health commissioners, 
managers and, ultimately, politicians; and decisions about what to research will be 
made by research funding bodies, drug companies and the like.  It is worth 
recalling that for all practitioners, their practice choices will also constitute praxis, 
that as well as meeting the goals of their practice they attempt to meet their overall 
goal of doing or living well.  Some practices are such that their goals are likely to 
run foul of the goal of living well.  Successful criminals, terrorists and assassins are 
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not, pace relativists, living well.  But most practices, including those outlined here 
relating to healthcare and management, are compatible with living well; a good 
nurse will also be someone who, barring ill luck, lives well.  Hence as practitioners 
they will be concerned that there is an insufficient evidence base in some areas of 
practice, or that there is injustice in resource allocation.  This concern is seen in 
numerous ways, such as Government reports.  The response to the injustice that 
relates to EBP should be to encourage research in those areas, not to turn away 
from EBP itself.      
 
 
6. Conclusion 
The practice of EBP is largely exonerated in this account; it does not of itself give 
rise to ethical concerns whereas failure to do so often would.  However, right action 
requires more than good evidence; it requires also the right ends, the right desires 
and the ability to apply all this as a package in any particular situation.  This latter 
ability is practical wisdom and combines various abilities, including the nous 
ability to discern the relevant particulars.  And it is in the particular situations 
where EBP might appear to diverge from ethical best practice as the relevant 
particulars may diverge from those measured as important outcomes in the original 
research.  There is a second way in which EBP might appear unethical: this is 
when strength of evidence is used as a method of prioritisation of health care; this 
seems obviously wrong once noticed but can slip through as apparently rational or 
'scientific' if it is not.  By providing the tools for practitioners and researchers to 
note the difference between epistemic wisdom and practical wisdom, Aristotle helps 
resolve one area of concern relating to evidence-based practice. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 3: Terminology used in this chapter alongside Greek and alternative 
translations 
 
Term used in 
this chapter 
Greek 
Transliteration 
Greek Other translations 
Crisp Irwin Important 
alternatives 
Scientific 
knowledge 
Episteme ʼεπιστήμη Scientific 
knowledge 
Scientific 
knowledge 
 
Good 
deliberation 
Euboulia ʼεβουλια Noble 
deliberation 
Fine 
deliberation 
 
Practical 
knowledge 
Dianoia 
Praktiken 
διάνοια 
πράκτικην 
Practical 
thought 
Practical 
thought 
 
Practical 
wisdom 
Phronesis φρονήσις Practical 
wisdom 
Intelligence  
Cleverness Deinotes δεινότητα Cleverness Cleverness  
Voluntary Hekousion ʻεκουσιον Voluntary Voluntary, 
willing 
Intentional 
Involuntary Akousion ʼακουσιον Involuntary Involuntary, 
unwilling 
Unintentional 
Desire  Orexis ʼορέξις Desire Desire  
Desire of 
appetite 
Epithumia ʼεπιθύμια Appetite Appetite  
Rational 
choice 
Prohairesis προʻαιρεσίς Rational 
choice 
Decision Choice 
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